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Effects of New Audit Regulation on Auditors´ Perceptions 
by Independence Issues, Audit Planning Activities and 
Reporting Decisions – 
Comparative Questionnaire Surveys 1995 and 2005 in a 
Danish context 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of new audit regulation on the behaviour of Danish 
State Authorized Public Accountants when they confront independence threats, audit 
planning activities and reporting problematic findings in the audit report. 
The detail approach and the stressing of the importance of scepticism in new audit 
regulation are expected to make the auditors´ decisions by interpreting principles 
more restrictive, or direct in conformity with prescriptive regulation, whereas the 
importance of professional judgement is diminishing by independence threats and 
reporting decisions. Furthermore, the complexity of the new audit process is likely to 
increase the weight of planning and reporting activities, the use of qualified 
resources (senior staff and State Authorized Public Accountants) and interim 
auditing. 
The approach used is questionnaire surveys in 1995 and 2005 respectively, in 1995 
with 94 and in 2005 with 121 State Authorized Public Accountants as respondents.  
The hypotheses are supported, except for the absence of an expected complexity effect 
of the new audit process in the context of a small audit engagement. Auditors are 
more restrictive in 2005 when confronted with threats of self evaluations by second 
engagements for an audit client, by a big audit client they take the complexity of the 
new audit process into account, and they do more often report problematic findings 
in compliance with regulation in 2005. Finally their reporting decisions are less 
influenced by external factors in regard to consequences for the client and the 
personal relation to client management in 2005. 
Furthermore it seems likely that many of the effects are more conspicuous in Big 
Four audit firms. This could portend more strict reactions in the future in general 
given that new tendencies are first discernible in big leading audit firms.    
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1 Purpose 
 
The overall purpose of this paper is to analyse the influence of the intensified 
regulation on auditors´ attitudes relating to different aspects of an “audit of historical 
financial information” in a Danish context.1 Independence, planning/performing/re-
porting audits, and reporting problematic findings are the three main themes of the 
paper. The intensified regulation is manifest in laws, the new 8.th Directive of the 
EU, and, most significant, in the new international standards on planning the audit, 
which have been implemented as Danish Audit Risk standards 12.15. 2004. 
Auditors´ attitudes in 2005 are compared to attitudes expressed in a survey from 
1995. For this reason, all questions are from Kiertzner (1996) with some minor 
necessary adjustments. 
 
In general, new regulation is detailed as opposed to being based more exclusively on 
principles with a reference to the auditors´ professional judgement. This by nature 
leads the auditor always to consult the rules for answers while on the other hand 
auditors´ professional judgement more rarely is considered a valid base for making 
decisions. Besides, an ever increasing number of references to the need of a sceptical 
attitude are fundamental characteristics in the wake of Enron, Worldcom, Parmelat 
etc. Obviously, these references create an impetus to be restrictive by interpretations 
of principles.  
 
In general the questions in the survey cf. Appendix 1 on independence and reporting 
problematic findings are focused on issues where regulations in 1995 and in 2005 are 
quite similar in the Danish context. This makes it possible to analyse, in reporting 
cases whether auditors in 2005 to a higher degree are abiding by rules and in 
independence cases whether they are more restrictive interpreting principles. 
  
The Danish setting is characterized by very widespread legal audits, being a member 
country of the EU.2 This means that many traditional SME-problems are paramount. 
The auditor often provides accounting assistance to an audit client with immanent 
threats of self evaluation. On balance, auditors´ assistance to SME` is most likely a 
benefit to society, and a too restrictive interpretation of the principle of independence 
would therefore probably be a detriment. By planning the audit, some of the main 
                                                 
1 This terminology is from the IAASB framework for assurance engagements – audits and reviews 
of historical financial information (100-1999 and 2000-2999 respectively) and other assurance 
engagements (3000-3999). 
2 Only very small limited companies are exempt from audit in the Danish context. Two out of three 
limits may not be exceeded: assets of app. 200 t. Euros, turnover of app. 400 t. Euros and 12 
employees. The limits of possible exemption in the EU Directives are app. 3.900 t. Euros for assets, 
app. 7.800 t. Euros for turnover and 50 employees.  
 2
SME issues would be to downsize the risk assessment procedures to fit the planning 
of the audit in a simple context, to carve out the necessary level of documentation, 
including documentation of what might be seen as an evident and a priori fact that 
audit plans overall need to be based on substantive procedures, and to interpret the 
statement that substantive procedures in some cases are inadequate as sole vehicle to 
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence. By planning the audit, over-implemen-
tation and thereby audit inefficiency seems to be the greater risk. In relation to 
reporting problematic findings, the SME risk on the other hand is under-
implementation. How to combine the assisting role with the critical function is a 
central issue. In many cases of the past the auditors´ professional judgement might in 
practice have led to overriding legislation, or to consider legislation as “theory” that 
should be bypassed and overruled by real life necessities in specific circumstances. 
With the intensified regulation and impetus on the sceptical attitude such a SME 
override is harder to justify.   
      
The next section 2 deals with the characteristics of newer regulation, before section 3 
presents the research questions and the surveys in context. The analysis follows in 
section 4 and section 5 sums up.  
 
2 The basic elements in new regulation – scepticism and 
detail rule approach  
 
2.1 Scepticism 
Following in the footsteps of accounting regulation the need for a sceptical attitude is 
gaining ground in new standards on auditing, ISA. Scepticism has two aspects: 
 
• The dominant aspect in relation to management representations and other 
types of audit evidence, and 
• A minor aspect in relation to the auditor, securing that the auditor does what 
is deemed necessary considering circumstances. 
  
The required sceptical attitude when the auditor is confronting management repres-
entations and other audit evidence is manifest in a rising number of explicit state-
ments. 
The importance of the auditor being sceptical is stressed in the generic planning 
standards RS 315 and RS 330 (2005) when obtaining audit evidence throughout from 
risk assessment procedures and risk assessments to general and specific reactions 
addressing identified risks of material misstatements. This basic requirement is 
stressed further in RS 240 (revised 2006) in relation to fraud. 
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On a more specific level scepticism is stressed in current updating projects with 
regard to standards on audit evidence. ED ISA 540 (2006) requires the auditor to do 
more specific evaluations of whether managements´ accounting estimates are materi-
ally misstated and further whether such misstatements are resulting from manage-
ment bias. Most significant, ED ISA 550 (2006) on related parties is per se with 
explicit reference to Enron and Maxwell. Undisclosed related party transactions and 
affiliations were major instruments in cheating the market successfully for a long 
time.3
A further manifestation of scepticism is the increasing number of references to mana-
gement responsibilities in auditing standards. In essence, this is merely redundant 
references to facts from corporate law.  When law and regulation oblige the auditor to 
remind management of its responsibilities in a rising number of cases it can only be 
interpreted as manifestations of scepticism. Examples of paraphrases of management 
responsibilities are RS 240 (revised 2006) in relation to fraud, and the far more 
detailed elaboration in the new RS 700 (revised 2007) when compared to RS 700 in 
the context of the audit report.4  
 
Scepticism on such a high note is as of yet not a dominant main feature in relation to 
the auditor. Standards are still mainly based on the assumption that auditors will 
comply with the rules, and that they do not actively seek for loopholes in the structure 
of standards but rather try to fill gaps by professionally considering the necessary 
steps when obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence. An explanatory factor 
behind this may be that audit standardization internationally still to a high degree is 
professional regulation.5
Small signs of standardsetter scepticism as to whether an auditor will always make 
the right choice are nonetheless observable in some black letter paragraphs in RS 240 
(revised 2006) on management override of internal controls, broad investigative 
inquiries into fraud on different organizational levels, and the a priori assumption that 
income recognition is a significant risk of material misstatement due to fraud with the 
generic consequences known from RS 330 (2005).6 From a strictly professional point 
                                                 
3 Jf. IAASB (September 2004), agenda 2 A, Revision of ISA 550 “Related Parties. Issues Paper”. 
The heading of paragraphs 2-5, arguing the case of the project, is plain and simple “Lessons From 
the Enron and Maxwell Cases”. 
4 Cf. on management representations in the former RS 240 (2004), paragraph 51, and the existing 
fraud standard RS 240 (revised 2006), paragraph 91. On paraphrasing management responsibilities 
in the audit report, cf. RS 700 (revised 2007), paragraph 60. 
5 The pressure on this status is outspoken, cf. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the 
US, and the EU Commissions´ pressure on IFAC and IAASB to involve non-professional interests 
(e.g. political interests) in the process as a prerequisite of sanctioning standards after the new 8. 
directive, cf. EU Commission 2004, p. 6. EU-implementation will be dependant on ”satisfactory 
governance arrangements relating to the operation of the IAASB being established”. 
6 Cf. RS 240 (revised 2006), paragraphs 74-76 (management override), paragraphs 34-47 (broad in- 
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of view all these procedures can be conceived of as merely underlining the fact that 
the subject matters will always (or nearly always, for the method of income recog-
nition) be significant risks of material misstatements due to fraud.7 Explaining this in 
such detail nonetheless implicitly rests on scepticism as to whether any auditor would 
reach these conclusions when left on his own. 
Another sign of a minor key of mistrust is manifest in the reason given for dividing 
”modifications” in the existing RS 701 into ”modifications” meaning qualifications in 
the coming ED 705 (2006) and “emphasis of matter and other matter paragraphs” in 
the coming ED ISA 706 (2006). This division is explicitly intended to make it 
obvious to the auditor that the two concepts are complementary. It is not possible to 
hide away a qualification (e.g. because of a disagreement with management) as an, in 
the eyes of the client perhaps, less critical emphasis of matter paragraph.8
Such signs of scepticism in the professions´ regulation may historically be attempts to 
avoid that standardization is taken out of the hands of the profession. This goal is no 
longer achievable, it seems. In the US the SOX legislation and the PCAOB has put an 
end to the professions prerogatives, and a similar development is well underway in 
the EU, cf. the revised 8.directive, whose standard approving mechanism is without 
influence from the profession.  
 
2.2 Detail Rule Approach by Standardsetting 
Another basic characteristic of new international auditing standards is the dominance 
of the US-inspired detail approach, and the corresponding defeat of the principle 
based approach as it was traditionally ingrained in the work of the IAASB. Somehow 
this seems a paradox considering that the crisis of auditing as a trustworthy 
profession primarily has an US background. “More of the same” seems a bad choice 
since it did not work in the past, and furthermore since the diagnosis: ”poor and de-
fect detail rules”, often is a genuinely wrong diagnosis for US corporate debacles.9  
The detail approach is dominant in the overall audit risk model as such in RS 300 
(2006), RS 315 (2005), RS 330 (2005) and RS 500 (2005) on planning activities and 
generic audit evidence. RS 315 especially seems very complex, full of redundancies 
and unnecessary details and therefore less comprehensible. As a next step RS 240 
                                                                                                                                                                  
quiries as risk assessment procedures), and paragraphs 60 and 110 (on income recognition). 
7 Classification as a significant risk of material misstatement has the usual consequences: internal 
control has to be considered (understanding design and implementation) and if possible tested, 
further substantive procedures have to be performed, and if all audit evidence is obtained from 
substantive procedures some of these have to be tests of detail. Finally, no rotation of tests of 
controls is possible. 
8 Cf. IAASB (March 2005), Explanatory Memorandum p. 2. 
9 A more balanced analysis indicates that most corporate scandals was combined with trespassing 
detail rules and not in the first place taking advantage of loopholes in a defect structure of rules. On 
Enron, cf. Enron Report (2002) and based upon this report George Benston, Michael Bromwich, 
Robert E. Litan & Alfred Wagenhofer (2003).  
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(revised 2006) in its structure includes a total audit process relating to the subject 
matter “fraud”, and details a multitude of audit procedures as fundamental reactions 
to general and specific risks of material misstatements. This tendency is further 
broadened in coming new revised standards such as ED ISA 540 on accounting 
estimates, ED ISA 320 on materiality and ED 550 on related parties, with audit 
process conformity, auditors´ scepticism and more exact detail rules for identifying 
misinformation as a few keywords behind the fact that the new revised versions are 
triple+ the size of the outdated versions. To mention is furthermore the new reporting 
standards RS 700 (revised 2007), ED ISA 705 and ED ISA 706 with broad descrip-
tions of the new audit process and of management and auditor responsibilities.10
A further manifestation of detail based ruling is IFAC´ Code of Ethics which is an 
integrated part of the IAASB´ standards. The rules on independence are presumed to 
be based on principles regarding threats and possible safeguards, considering deduced 
perceptions of a well informed third party. Nonetheless, the many examples given are 
likely to be handled by auditors as if they were detail rules, especially in the post-
Enron context of good behaviour. The principle based approach is likely to disappear 
into vagueness. 
 
2.3 Expected Consequences of Scepticism and the Detail Rule Approach 
The focus on scepticism as the domineering attitude of auditors´ and the growing im-
portance and weight of detail rules are expected to have a number of consequences. 
 
By independence issues it is expected that auditors will be restrictive by decisions of 
whether other assignments are compatible with the audit assignment. The many 
detailed examples of threats caused by risks of self evaluation are likely to be practi-
ced as if they were rules, especially in the actual circumstances where eager and scep-
tical implementation is the dominant tone.  
By planning an audit engagement it is expected that the new RS will lead to the use 
of, on average, more qualified resources. An audit is expected to be more complex, 
since risk assessment procedures, risk evaluations and tests of controls are heavier 
building blocks in the new audit risk model. These procedures are not likely to be 
delegated to un-experienced assistants in the audit team. Besides it is to be expected 
that planning and reporting activities will be upgraded compared to performing 
activities, and finally that a larger proportion of the audit activities will take place 
interim, since this is typical by performance of risk assessment procedures and tests 
of controls. The new audit approach would on balance be some combination of more 
qualified personnel, more planning/reporting activities and more interim audit 
procedures.  
                                                 
10 ED ISA 540 (revised), ED ISA 550 (revised), ISA 700 (revised 2004), ED ISA 705 and ED ISA 
706. 
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By reporting, some effects are expected as consequences of auditors being focused on 
rules whereas the auditors´ professional judgement as a rationale for making indivi-
dual departures in specific circumstances is relegated to a minor position. In the past, 
many auditors in a Danish context have had a false conception of theory versus 
regulation versus practice, often outright mistaking regulation for theory. Educational 
background was a major reason behind this, since most State Authorized Public 
Accountants hardly ever were confronted with theory. By such a misinterpretation, 
“rules as mere theory” could always be overridden by practical circumstances, and 
this override was the broad playing field for the professional judgement of the 
auditor. Scepticism and the weight of rules will probably per se in the future lead the 
auditors to be more in conformity with written rules. 
 
3 Surveys and Research Questions 
 
The questionnaire is shown in Appendix 1. The questions were, with minor necessary 
adjustments, the same in 1995, cf. Kiertzner (1996), and in 2005. 
 
3.1 The Surveys 
In the 1995 survey, questionnaires were mailed to 216 randomly selected State Au-
thorized Public Accountants, and 94 valid answers were obtained, cf. Kiertzner 
(1996). The sampling was made systematically from a membership list provided by 
the Institute of State Authorized Public Accountants. 
 
In the 2005 survey, questionnaires were mailed to 400 randomly selected State 
Authorized Public Accountants from the electronic membership list of the Institute. 
121 valid answers were obtained. 
 
The response rate declines from 43 to 30 %, probably resulting from a higher 
workload, cf. Appendix 2, and a rising number of survey participations. In both years 
tests were made for late response effects. Since none was found, it seems legitimate 
to consider the sample respondents as fair bases for evaluation of population 
statistics. 
  
Appendix 2 shows some demographic characteristics of sample respondents. Table 1 
below shows figures for the independent variables that are used later in multiple 
regression analyses. The survey question is in Appendix 1, Question 1. 
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Table 1 Independent variables – Big Six/Big Four, Age and Audit-Speciality 
  1995 2005 Total 
Big Six/Big Four No 56 66 122
  Yes 35 55 90
Total 91 121 212
Age +45 Younger (Max. 45) 51 45 96
  Older (45+) 43 76 119
Total 94 121 215
Audit Specialist No (-30 % of time) 59 72 131
  Ja (30+ % of time) 34 44 78
Total 93 116 209
  
3.2 Research Questions 
 
3.2.1 Independence 
Independence scenarios, cf. Appendix 1 Question 2, are all on subjects in the grey 
zone where no absolute solution existed in neither 1995 nor 2005. In this way, the 
auditors´ personal attitudes and mental setup is tested relative to boundaries of prin-
ciples. By establishing grey zone scenarios it was taken into account that Danish legal 
regulation in the period shifted from a strict regulation on general independence 
combined with some rules on specific independence to the international standard 
principle based rule on independence in appearance and independence in fact. All 
scenarios relate to principles only and not prescriptive rules.11
The nine scenarios in Question 2 are similar in structure: whether the respondent as 
the auditor of the financial statements would also consider himself to be able to 
accept, with or without safeguards, another assignment for the same entity. The 
second assignment is: 
 
• Preparation of the memorandum of association/articles of incorporation 
• Preparation of a shareholders agreement 
• Preparation of registration forms 
• The role as tax-advisor for the entity 
• The role as tax-advisor for the founders personally 
• Development and implementation of EDP-based accounting systems 
• Bookkeeping on the basis of manual journals of the entity 
• Compilation of the financial statements of the entity 
                                                 
11 This shift was made effective in the law on auditors LSRR September 1. 2003. This law 
implemented the recommendation of the EU Commission (2002). Later the IFAC Code of Ethics 
was implemented, cf. FSR (Bestyrelse og Etikudvalg) (2004) and IFAC (2004). 
To secure the grey zone status in 2005 the scenarios were explicated not to concern so called public 
interest entities, since these on a few of the scenarios are strictly ruled en detail.  
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• Compilation of the financial statements of the entity by another State 
Authorized Public Accountant in the audit firm. 
 
All the scenarios should be answered by unconditional acceptance – “Yes” – or 
unconditional refusal – “No” – and finally acceptance based on necessary safeguards 
– “Yes, if …” 
  
 The hypothesis is: 
 
H1 Auditors´ unconditional acceptance of another assignment simultaneous      
     with the audit assignment in scenarios with no prescriptive rules is less like- 
     ly in 2005 than it was in 1995. 
 
3.2.2 Audit planning activities  
Audit planning questions are deducted from a small client scenario and a big client 
scenario, cf. Appendix 1 question 3 and 4. The two questions represent planning 
activities by a small audit client and a bigger sized audit client respectively.12 It is 
expected that the new risk based approach requires: 
 
• More qualified audit resources (relatively more time allocated to senior staff 
members of the audit team and State Authorized Public Accountants) 
• Use of relative more time on planning and reporting of the audit 
• Use of relative more time interim because of the focus on risk assessment 
procedures and tests of controls. 
 
The variable  
 
log (qualified time (%) + planning/reporting (%) + interim (%)) 
 
measures the cumulative effect of the new risk based audit approach. The hypothesis 
is: 
 
H2 Auditors use a more risk based audit approach in 2005 than they did in 
     1995. 
 
3.2.3 Reporting in the audit report  
Reporting on problematic issues is the subject of five different scenarios in Appendix 
1, Question 5 and 6. For all five scenarios the regulation 2005 is basically unchanged 
                                                 
12 The numbers for assets etc. were inflated with the price index in 2005 (up by app. 23 %) to secure 
the same size of clients in the two years.   
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compared to 1995. In this way, the responses only measure the degree of the rule 
conformity of the auditors. 
The scenarios are:  
 
• Disagreement with management who does not disclose required informa-
tion on important R & D activities in the Directors´ report (Special Danish 
regulation requiring a qualified opinion13)  
• Possible penalty because management does not entirely fulfill the legal re-
quirements on safekeeping of accounting records (Special Danish regulation 
requiring an other matter paragraph14) 
• Disagreement with management regarding useful life (and consequently de-
preciation) of machinery (qualified opinion)  
• Possible penalty because of a violation of the limits for discharging of waste 
water (Special Danish regulation requiring an other matter paragraph15) 
• Uncertainty regarding the presumption of going concern (qualified/adverse 
opinion or an emphasis of matter paragraph). 
 
The hypothesis is: 
 
H3 Auditors more often report on problematic issues in the audit report in  
     2005 than they did in 1995. 
 
In the questions, cf. Appendix 1 the respondents are asked to specify their exact reac-
tion. In the context of this paper, the line is drawn between respondents who will 
report on the problematic issues in the audit report versus the respondents who will 
not. The exact form of modification is not taken into account and is deemed less 
important to the public.16
  
By going concern uncertainty, cf. Question 6 in Appendix 1, it is furthermore tested, 
whether the auditors´ reporting decisions depend on external factors. When the going 
concern assumption is problematic, the auditor is under extreme pressure, since his 
                                                 
13 The reason for this is that not only the financial statements but also the Directors Report lies 
inside the scope of an audit in a Danish context. Normally, the scenario could result in an emphasis 
of matter paragraph, cf. RS 720 and RS 700. 
14 This terminology is from the future ED ISA 706. In existing Danish regulation it is still called an 
emphasis of matter paragraph. 
15 Cf. footnote 14. 
16 These limitations of analyses are necessitated by the fact that the prescriptive rules on how to 
report exactly are slightly different in 2005 than they were in 1995. This is especially the case by 
going concern uncertainty where the “subject to”- modification was handled as an all inclusive 
category in 1995.  
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decision on how to cope with the situation in the audit report may be decisive for the 
audit clients´ survival. This auditors´ reporting sensitivity is measured on a four level 
Likert scale for the variables: 
 
• Third Party reactions 
• Unfavourable consequences for the company 
• Effect on the relationship between auditor and company board/manage-
ment. 
 
The hypothesis is: 
 
H4 Auditors are less influenced by external factors by reporting decisions  
     2005 than they were in 1995. 
 
3.2.4 Influence of independent variables besides the year of survey 
Besides the expected influence of whether the respondent is from 1995 or 2005 the 
multiple regression analyses of the next section will test for whether Big Six/Big Four 
affiliation, the respondents´ age and degree of expertise in relation to audit 
assignments have any influence. 
 
Expressed vaguely, there might be some tendencies to faster implementations of new 
practices in the multinational audit firms, by younger practitioners and by audit 
specialists.   
 
 
4 Analysis 
 
In table 2 multiple regression analyses are shown for testing the hypotheses relating 
to the three dependent variables: 
 
Acceptance of other assignments: 
 
Average of the nine different scenarios (0-1) 
 
Risk based audit approach by the Big Client/Small Client: 
 
Log (qualified time (%) + planning/reporting (%) + interim (%)) (0-6) 
 
Reporting problematic findings: 
  
Average of five different scenarios (0-1) 
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The dependent variables in the analyses are: 
 
 
Year 
  
1995 = 0 2005 = 1 
 
Big Six/Four 
  
Non Big Six/Four = 0  Big Six/Four = 1   
 
Age 
  
1 - Discrete, years of age 
 
Audit Specialist 
  
1 – 100 % of productive time on audit assignments 
 
 
Table 2 Multiple Regression Analyses – Effects of New Audit Approach 2005  
vs. 1995 
Acceptance of Other Risk-based Audit Approach Reporting Pro- 
Assignments           Big Client      Small Client blematic Issues
Constant             0.759*    2.138*               2.070*      0.486* 
Year            -0.309*                 0.144***           0.058                       0.476* 
Big Six/Four         -0.165**               0.137***         -0.157**       0.015    
Age                        0.136**              -0.038                 0.053        -0.026   
Audit Specialist    -0.095                   0.088                 0.140***        -0.118*** 
 
R2                      0.161      0.049              0.036          0.229 
Durbin-Watson           2.015      1.923              2.103        1.993  
Max. Correlation        0.257      0.257              0.257        0.257  
* Significant < 0.01      ** Significant < 0.05      *** Significant < 0.10  
 
 
The multiple regression analyses of table 2 supports H1 and H3 whereas H2 is only 
partially supported by the big client and not at all by the small client. The results indi-
cate that auditors react more strict by visible and obvious issues of evaluating threats 
relative to their independence and their reporting obligations than they do on the 
more complex issue of audit planning activities. 
Besides, more of the analyses show a significant Big Four effect since auditors here 
are more alert to new developments. They are more likely to reject second assign-
ments for audit clients, and are more consequently implementing the new audit risk 
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model by the big client, whereas this model does not seem to have the same effects 
when implemented by small clients. 
 
When dividing the reporting variable into reporting material problematic issues 
(R&D, Useful life of assets and Going concern uncertainty) and reporting formal 
problematic issues (Safekeeping of accounting records and Penalty for discharging of 
waste water), table 3 shows that the effect of “abiding by the rules” is by far more 
significant by the formal issues. This indicates that auditors´ professional judgement 
in their perception is no longer as it was the case in 1995 a base for an override of 
prescriptive rules in the legislation as “merely theory”. 
 
 
Table 3 Multiple Regression Analyses – Reporting Material vs. Formal Matters in the 
Audit Report 2005 vs. 1995 
 
 Reporting formal Reporting material 
  problemtic issues problematic issues           
     
Constant                     0.295**         0.642* 
Year                    0.538*          0.257* 
Big Six/Four       -0.066          0.076             
Age                                                      -0.009                             -0.043 
Audit Specialist                                   -0.117***                       -0.080 
 
R2                                                                    0.297                                      0.072 
Durbin-Watson                                               1.947                                      2.157 
Max Correlation                                             0.519                                      0.257    
* Significant < 0.01      ** Significant < 0.05      *** Significant < 0.10  
 
  
 
Table 4 shows reporting decision dependency on external factors. The three inde-
pendent variables are: 
 
Third Party Reactions 
 
Likert scale 1= no influence  …….. 4 = great influence 
 
Unfavorable consequences for the company 
 
Likert scale 1= no influence  …….. 4 = great influence 
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Effect on the relationship between auditor and company board/management 
 
Likert scale 1= no influence  …….. 4 = great influence 
 
The independent variables are the same as by the tests shown in table 2 and 3. 
 
 
Table 4 Influence of External Factors by Reporting Going Concern Uncertainty 
(Likert Scale 1-4) 
 
Third party      Unfavorable consequences  Effect on perso- 
reactions      for the company  nal relations 
Constant     2.680*                          2.521*            2.519* 
Year      0.019                          -0.316*                         -0.283* 
Big Six/Four  -0.168**                      -0.083       -0.056 
Age                                -0.080                           0.027           -0.057  
Audit Specialist              0.063                          -0.058       -0.156** 
 
R2               0.031    0.115         0.126 
Durbin-Watson    1.854    1.913         2.122  
Max. Correlation    0.257    0.307         0.287  
* Significant < 0.01      ** Significant < 0.05  
 
 
The analyses in table 4 support H4 except for the reporting sensitivity by Third party 
reactions. The Big Four firm auditors, though, show the expected reduced sensitivity 
on this factor as well.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Questionnaire 
 
1Personal information 
 
Your fields of activity 
 
Please answer the following questions concerning your fields of activity. 
 
Approximate number of working hours a year   
 _____ hours 
 
Working hours divided between direct and indirect time (approximate) 
 
Direct client-related time         % 
Indirect time  ____% 
    100 % 
 
Division of your direct, client-related time (approximate) 
 
Audits of financial statements          % 
Accounting services          % 
Tax advisory services          % 
Legal advisory services          % 
Other client-related work  ____% 
     100 % 
Your age 
 
Please give the following information regarding your age 
 
            Your present age     ______years 
            Your age when qualifying as a State Authorized Public Accountant ______years 
 
Your sex 
 
1 Female         2 Male 
 
Information about your firm 
  
Part of/affiliated with the Big Four?  1 yes  2 no 
 
Approximate number of professionals (including staff) 
in Denmark    _______ 
 
Approximate number of offices in Denmark _______ 
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2 Independence 
 
Please consider the following cases concerning problems related to combining the role as an auditor 
with some other function. Assume that the cases do not involve special important companies (listed 
companies e.g.) 
 
a. In connection with the incorporation of a company you have accepted to take on the audit. 
The founders ask you if you can take on the following services as well: 
 
Preparation of the memorandum of association/articles of incorporation 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
Preparation of a shareholders agreement 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
Preparation of registration forms 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
The role as tax-advisor for the company 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
The role as tax-advisor for the founders personally 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
2 Independence (continued) 
 
b. You are the management consultant for a company. Your fees from this job come up to 9 % 
of your gross revenue. The consulting concerns EDP, e.g. development and implementation 
of EDP-based accounting systems. The client suggests that you might take over the audit 
because you know the accounting systems so well. The audit fee will probably be of the 
same size as the consulting fee you have been receiving up until now. 
 
1 you will take on the audit  2 you will not take on the audit 
 
3 you will take on the audit, if ____________________________________ 
 
c. One of your audit clients asks you 
 
 whether you could take over the bookkeeping on the basis of manual journals of the client. 
You answer 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 whether you could take over the compilation of the financial statements. You answer 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 whether another State Authorized Public Accountant could take over the compilation of the 
financial statements while you remain as auditor. You answer 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
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2 Independence (continued) 
 
d. One of your audit clients asks you 
 
 whether you could code transactions using a general chart of accounts accepted and issued 
by management. You answer 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 whether you could make a due diligence report prior to the clients acquisition of a 
subsidiary. You answer  
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 whether you could use your experience to estimate the useful life of tangible assets, so that 
management can use your estimations afterwards. You answer 
 
 1 yes    2 no 
 
 3 yes, if ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3 A typical small audit engagement 
 
Suppose that a small audit engagement is defined as an audit of a client with: 
 
A balance sheet total of  31 Mio.DKK. 
An equity of     9 Mio.DKK. 
Net turnover of   49 Mio.DKK 
Pretax accounting income of    3 Mio.DKK 
Number of employees   50 
 
Please assume that the client is engaged in industry, and that internal controls are insufficient. 
 
Please answer the following questions on materiality, time-consumption and time-allocation on a 
typical client in this category in an audit of financial statements 2005. 
 
What would your preliminary judgment of materiality be  _________ DKK. 
 
Estimated time-consumption in total     _________ hours 
 
 
 20
Typical allocation of time on different categories of professionals 
Staff with less than two years of experience   _________ % 
Staff with more than two years of experience   _________ % 
State Authorized Public Accountants   _________ % 
 
Typical allocation of time in phases in the audit process 
Planning     _________ % 
Performing     _________ % * 
Reporting (audit report, management letter)   _________ % 
 
* Estimated allocation of time in the performing phase 
Interim     _________ % 
Year end     _________ % 
 
4 A typical big sized audit engagement 
 
Suppose that a big sized audit engagement is defined as an audit of a client with: 
 
A balance sheet total of  184 Mio.DKK. 
An equity of     37 Mio.DKK. 
Net turnover of   367 Mio.DKK 
Pretax accounting income of      6 Mio.DKK 
Number of employees  300 
 
Please assume that the client is engaged in industry, and that internal controls are good. 
 
Please answer the following questions on materiality, time-consumption and time-allocation on a 
typical client in this category in an audit of financial statements 2005. 
 
What would your preliminary judgment of materiality be  _________ DKK. 
 
Estimated time-consumption in total    _________ hours 
 
Typical allocation of time on different categories of professionals 
Staff with less than two years of experience   _________ % 
Staff with more than two years of experience   _________ % 
State Authorized Public Accountant   _________ % 
 
Typical allocation of time in phases in the audit process 
Planning     _________ % 
Performing     _________ % * 
Reporting (audit report, management letter)   _________ % 
 
* Estimated allocation of time in the performing phase 
Interim     _________ % 
Year end     _________ % 
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5 Reporting in the audit report/management letter 
 
Please state your likely reaction as an auditor to the following situations.  
 
a. A company has reported its financial statements and Directors Report without the required 
information on important research and development activities. This will not be changed. 
Your reaction would probably be (more simultaneous answers are  a possibility) 
1 to qualify your opinion 
2 to issue an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph 
3 to comment on the issue in the management report 
4 another reaction__________________________________________________ 
5 no reaction 
 
b. One of your audit clients does not entirely fulfill the legal requirements on safekeeping of 
accounting records. Vendors invoices are only stored for the last two years  due to lack of 
space. Otherwise, the records are proper. Your likely reaction would be (more 
simultaneous answers  are a possibility) 
1 to qualify your opinion 
2 to issue an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph 
3 to comment on the issue in the management report 
4 another reaction__________________________________________________ 
5 no reaction 
 
c. One of your audit clients has acquired a very large piece of machinery for the production, 
which is depreciated in the financial statements with 10 % p.y. on a straight line basis. You 
cannot decide that this is inappropriate or illegal , but in your opinion the machinery should 
rather be depreciated at a 20 % rate. In Your opinion, the effect could  be material on the 
financial statements. You would consider (more simultaneous answers  are a possibility) 
1 to qualify your opinion 
2 to issue an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph 
3 to comment on the issue in the management report 
4 another reaction__________________________________________________ 
5 no reaction 
 
d. By chance, you become aware of the fact that an audit client violates the limits for 
discharging of waste water. The management is aware of this, but does not see it as a big 
deal, “while we do not risk anything but a minor fine”. The fact is not disclosed in the 
financial statements and Directors Report. As the auditor you would consider (would you 
consider??) (more simultaneous answers  are a possibility) 
1 to qualify your opinion 
2 to issue an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph 
3 to comment on the issue in the management report 
4 another reaction__________________________________________________ 
5 no reaction 
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6 Going Concern 
 
Please state your likely reaction as an auditor to the following situation. 
 
As an auditor you seriously investigated a qualification of your opinion on the presumption of going 
concern. In the final round you were convinced that a qualification was not needed, although 
material uncertainty still remained. Would your likely reaction then be (more simultaneous answers 
are a possibility) 
 
1 to supplement your audit report with an explanatory paragraph to document enquiries  
  and final conclusion 
2 to comment on the issue in the management letter 
3 other reaction___________________________________________________________ 
4 no reaction 
 
Please state the degree to which your decision on where and how to report your considerations in 
the situation above could be influenced by the following factors 
 
a. A third party would have the opportunity to learn about your considerations be a possible 
future insolvency 
 
1 no influence    2 small influence 3 some influence 4 great influence 
 
b. You wish to prevent a third party from obtaining knowledge of your considerations because 
since? this could lead to notfavorable consequences for the company (withdrawing of credit, 
withdrawing of suppliers and the like) 
 
1 no influence    2 small influence 3 some influence 4 great influence 
 
c. You wish to keep your good relationship with the company board and management 
 
1 no influence    2 small influence 3 some influence 4 great influence 
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Appendix 2 
 
Some demographic characteristics of the respondents in 
the 1995 and 2005 surveys 
 
Big Six/Big Four, number of employees, number of offices, age, age by qualification 
1995-2005 (t-tests of averages) 
   
Big Six/Four 
affiliation 
Number of 
employees in 
the Danish 
firm 
Number of 
offices in 
Denmark Age 
Age by 
qualifica-
tion 
1995 Share/average ,38 647,85 17,64 44,47 31,27 
  Respondents 91 55 55 94 94 
2005 Share/average ,45 707,21 9,73 48,24 31,52 
Respondents 121 120 120 121 121   
 
P 
 
 0.310 0.589 0.001 0.001 0.547 
 
 
Working hours, client related time and indirect time 1995-2005 (t-tests of averages) 
   Working hours p.a. Client related time in % Indirect time in % 
1995 Average 2015,55 66,98 33,02 
  Respon-
dents 93 94 94 
2005 Average 2066,94 63,29 36,71 
Respon-
dents 117 119 119 
  
 
P   
0.236 
 
0.042 
 
0.042 
 
 
Client related time on different assignments 1995-2005 
   Audits 
Accounting 
Services 
Tax Advisory 
Services 
Legal Advi-
sory Services 
Other 
Client Rela-
ted Work 
1995 Average in % 30,62 24,35 22,08 2,69 20,26 
  Respondents 93 93 93 93 93 
2005 Average in % 31,43 23,25 22,75 3,70 18,87 
Respondents 116 116 116 116 116   
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